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EXEMPTIONS TO THE SUNSHINE LAW AND THE
PUBLIC RECORDS LAW: HAVE THEY IMPAIRED OPEN
GOVERNMENT IN FLORIDA?
MARY K. KRAEMER
INTRODUCTION
There are two open government laws in Florida: the Government
in the Sunshine Law' and the Public Records Law.2 Both are
broadly worded. Together, they seem to guarantee virtually com-
plete public access to the process of governmental decisionmaking
and the documents generated by that process. The Sunshine Law
states "[aIll meetings ... are declared to be public meetings open
to the public at all times." The Public Records Law declares "all
state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be open for a
personal inspection by any person. ' 4
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 286 (1979).
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1979).
3. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1979). Other jurisdictions have also enacted open meeting
provisions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.01
(Supp. 1979-80); ARK. STAT. ANN, § 12-2805 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11120 (West Supp.
1967-79); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-9-101 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (West Supp.
1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-1503a (West Supp.
1978-79); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92-3 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 67-2342 (Supp. 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-
1.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.3 (West Supp. 1979-80); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
75-4317 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 61.810 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.5 (West Supp.
1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 403 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1957); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A/2 (West 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 15.263 (West Supp.
1967-79); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-5 (Supp. 1979);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010 (Vernon 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-3402 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 241.020 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
91-A:2 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1
(Supp. 1979); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 98 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.12 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22
(Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 301 (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.630
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-3
(1977); S.C. CODE § 30-4-60 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-25-1 (1974); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1979); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp.
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-3 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (Supp. 1979); VA.
CODE § 2.1-343 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.030 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-3
(1979); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 19.83 (West Supp. 1979-80); Wyo. STAT. § 9-11-103 (1977).
4. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1979). Other states have also enacted public inspection and ac-
cess provisions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 12-40 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (1973);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
6253 (West Supp. 1967-79); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
1-19 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10003 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-1522
(West Supp. 1978-79); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92-51 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 9-301 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.6 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-3
(Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.2 (West 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (Supp. 1979);
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Despite that broad, all-encompassing language, the scope of
these laws and their applicability in a given situation are often
matters of litigation.' First, there are certain statutory and consti-
tutional exemptions to the policy of full disclosure. The courts are
called upon to decide how narrow these exemptions were meant to
be. Second, some public officials and agencies find it difficult to
comply with the laws.6 When meetings are closed or documents are
withheld, the public is deprived of its "right to know." Accord-
ingly, lawsuits are instituted to enforce these laws and to provide
access to government processes-access that has been wrongfully
withheld. Occasionally, in these situations, the courts have created
judicial exemptions which denied relief. This comment examines
the litigation surrounding the Sunshine and the Public Records
Laws to determine whether the judicial constructions and exemp-
tions have clouded our government "in the sunshine."
THE SUNSHINE LAW
"Red, that sunshine law, that's the sorriest, damn law you ever
got passed." That assessment of Florida's Sunshine Law was di-
rected at J. Emory "Red" Cross, the law's sponsor.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 61.872 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.31 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 2 (Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.233 (West Supp. 1967-79);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15-1621 (West Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.015 (Vernon 1979);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 59-512 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §
239.010 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2
(West Supp. 1979-80); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (1978); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1979-80); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132.6 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (West
1962); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.420 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (Purdon 1959); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 38-2-3 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 30-4-30 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 1-27-1 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (1980); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-26-2 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 315 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 2.1-342 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.260
(Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-3 (1980); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 19.21(2) (West 1972); Wyo.
STAT. § 9-9-102 (1977).
5. Some commentators have cited the broad language as the cause of widespread doubt
about the law's application. See, e.g., Kalil, Florida Sunshine Law, 49 FLA. B.J. 72 (1975).
For an examination of the problems entailed by the unlimited definition of "public meet-
ings" see Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REV.
451 (1975). See also Wickham, Let The Sun Shine In!, 68 Nw. L. REV. 480 (1973) for a
survey of open meeting legislation and a draft of a model law.
6. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973).
7. Cross attributed that statement to "some of [his] friends" in the course of a newspa-
per interview. Wyatt, Sunshine Law: How It Was, Fla. Times-Union, Feb. 20, 1977, § B, at
5, col. 5.
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Cross sponsored the Sunshine Law after becoming aware of jour-
nalists' dissatisfaction with backroom wheeling and dealing. He
first introduced the bill in the house of representatives in 1957.
Later, as a senator, he introduced it every year from 1959 until
1967, when the bill was finally enacted.' Significantly, the 1967 leg-
islative session was the first session to meet after reapportionment,
which diminished the influence of the "porkchoppers" and in-
creased the power of urban legislators. The Sunshine Law passed
unanimously.' 0 There was little debate on the senate floor. 1 Al-
though several legislative committees considered the bill, commit-
tee files and tape recordings of the committees' discussions are un-
available.12  Therefore, because no written record of the
committees' view of the Sunshine Law exists, we can only specu-
late about the impact that was envisioned. The wording of the law,
however, is unequivocal.
Florida's Sunshine Law applies to all public meetings "except as
otherwise provided in the Constitution."" In addition to that con-
stitutional limitation, there are five statutory exemptions to the
Sunshine Law that are located elsewhere in the Florida Statutes.
Certain proceedings of the Commission on Ethics,'4 certain pro-
ceedings of the Elections Commission, hearings held to challenge
material in student records, 6, certain collective bargaining negotia-
tions, 7 and deliberations of the Public Employees Relations Com-
mission's are all exempt from the operation of the law. Predictably,
8. Id. See ch. 67-356, 1967 Fla. Laws 1147 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1)
(1979)).
9. Wyatt, supra note 7, § B, at 5, col. 5.
10. FLA. S. JOUR. 1086 (Reg. Sess. 1967) (vote: 48 to 0); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1532 (Reg. Sess.
1967) (vote: 98 to 0).
11. Wyatt, supra note 7, § B, at 5, col. 5.
12. Interview with B. Gene Baker, Director of Florida Division of Legislative Library
Services, in Tallahassee, Fla. (May 23, 1980). Mr. Baker did not wish to rule out the possi-
bility that these records might someday be found.
13. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1979). The entire Florida open meeting provision states:
(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority
or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at which official acts
are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times,
and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as
taken or made at such meeting.
Id.
14. FLA. STAT. § 112.324(1) (1979).
15. FLA. STAT. § 106.25(5) (1979).
16. FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(c) (1979).
17. FLA. STAT. § 447.605(1) (1979).
18. FLA. STAT, § 447.205(10) (1979).
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some of these exemptions required judicial interpretation. An ex-
emption based on the constitutional right to bargain collectively
was recognized. 19 Another exemption was recognized when the su-
preme court gave effect to a special legislative act, thereby validat-
ing the exemption contained in the act. 0 A third exemption neces-
sarily resulted from the interaction of the Public Records Law with
the Sunshine Law. Because exempted records were to be discussed
at a meeting, the meeting had to be closed to the public or the
protection accorded to the records would be ineffective.2 The
courts did nothing untoward by recognizing these exemptions.
Each resulted from valid judicial interpretations of pertinent con-
stitutional or statutory provisions and is limited in scope.
In other cases, however,-the Florida courts went beyond inter-
pretation and actually created judicial exemptions from the Sun-
shine Law. These judicial exemptions, although based on the par-
ticular facts presented in each case, are potentially unlimited in
their application. Briefly, the courts have held that "quasi-judicial"
actions,2" "remote" actions, s and certain "staff" actions24 are ex-
empt from the Sunshine Law's operation. Although most of the
cases construing the Sunshine Law have required compliance with
its broad mandate for open meetings, the three judicially created
exemptions could seriously threaten continued public access to
governmental decisionmaking.
The genesis of the constitutional and judicially created exemp-
tions to the Sunshine Law and the particular factual situations in
which each arose are discussed below. The discussion is important
in two ways. First, the likelihood of further exemptions may be
assessed. And second, how the exemptions may be used to close
meetings becomes clearer.
The first constitutional exemption to the Sunshine Law was
recognized in Bassett v. Braddock.25 In Bassett, citizens sought to
19. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
20. Tribune Co. v. School Board, 367 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1979), construing ch. 69-1146, § 5,
1969 Fla. Laws 1258.
21. Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
22. See, e.g., State Dep't of Pollution Control v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d
846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 231 So. 2d 34 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973)
23. See, e.g., Krause v. Reno, 366 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Bennett v.
Warden, 333 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977); Florida Parole
and Probation Comm'n v. Thomas, 364 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
25. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972). See Comment, Government in the Sunshine: Another
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enjoin the Dade County school board negotiator from conducting
private preliminary contract negotiations with teachers' represent-
atives. The injunction also was sought to prevent the school board
from privately consulting with its own negotiator about the teacher
contract. The teachers intervened upon counterclaim for a declara-
tory decree as to teachers' collective bargaining rights.2 6 The trial
court denied the injunction and declared that the effectiveness of
the constitutional right to collective bargaining would be lessened
if preliminary negotiations were conducted in the sunshine.17 The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed. 8
The Florida Constitution grants employees the right to bargain
collectively,' 9 but at the time this case was decided, the legislature
had not passed any implementing legislation."0 The court was
"hesitant" to judicially implement the constitutional provision.3 1
Nevertheless, the teachers had produced some evidence that public
attendance at preliminary contract negotiations would adversely
affect their collective bargaining rights. Thus, the court recognized
the constitutional exemption to the Sunshine Law. To find
otherwise, stated the court, "could cause a damaging case of
'sunburn.' ",32
As to whether the school board could consult with its own nego-
tiator privately, the court held that it was in the public interest to
do so as a means of equalizing positions.3 The teachers could pri-
vately consult with their negotiators.3 4 As the dissent pointed out,
however, teachers, as public employees, do not have the right to
strike. Therefore, forcing the school board to publicly consult with
its negotiator would be a more realistic method of equalizing bar-
gaining positions. 3 The majority held that as long as the negotia-
tor was publicly hired, and the ultimate debate, decisions, official
acts and formal actions were public, then the public's right to
know would be protected." The majority was apparently im-
Cloud on the Horizon, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 603 (1973).
26. 262 So. 2d at 425-26.
27. Id. at 426.
28. Id. at 429.
29. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
30. 262 So. 2d at 426.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 427.
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 430.
36. Id. at 427.
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pressed by the fact that the negotiator's recommendations, which
were heard in a public meeting, were modified by the school board,
and then only accepted by a marginal vote of one. 7
Two years after Bassett, in 1974, the legislature passed the Em-
ployees Relations Act.8 In effect, the act affirmed that part of the
court's decision holding that the school board could consult with
its own negotiator privately, but, reversed that part of the decision
holding that negotiations with the teachers could be conducted pri-
vately."' Despite the legislature's disagreement over whether pre-
liminary collective bargaining negotiations should be in the sun-
shine, the court was not guilty of overreaching in Bassett. The
court was clearly acting in accordance with the Sunshine Law's
language, "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution,"
when it closed the negotiations. The history of the Bassett deci-
sion, however, is illustrative of the pattern of judicial-legislative
tension which permeates the process of defining the Sunshine
Law's parameters.
In Tribune Co. v. School Board,0 the Florida Supreme Court
had to pass on the constitutionality of a statutory exemption to the
Sunshine Law. By special act, applicable only to Hillsborough
County, the legislature provided that teachers could choose
whether disciplinary proceedings against them would be held pub-
licly or privately."' When a teacher opted for privacy, the local
newspaper, Tribune Company, sought injunctive and declaratory
relief. The trial court denied the injunction declaring that the stat-
utory provision was not an unauthorized delegation of legislative
authority and that it was a valid exemption from the Sunshine
Law.42 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.43 Giving the tradi-
tional presumption of constitutionality to the legislative act, the
court held that since the "charged teacher neither makes law nor
invokes it," but only exercises a limited option after the school
37. Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 447.605 (1979).
39. The act provides in relevant part:
(1) All discussions between the chief executive officer of the public employer,
or his representative, and the legislative body or the public employer relative to
collective bargaining shall be exempt from s. 286.011.
(2) The collective bargaining negotiations between a chief executive officer, or
his representative, and a bargaining agent shall be in compliance with a. 286.011.
FLA. STAT. § 447.605 (1979).
40. 367 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1979).
41. Id. at 628. See ch. 69-1146, § 5, 1969 Fla. Laws 1258.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 629.
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board has called for a hearing, the act was not an unauthorized
delegation of legislative authority.,4 Therefore, the court resolved
the conflict of statutes by giving effect to the later special act as "a
more specific expression of the legislative will" than the earlier en-
acted general Sunshine Law. 5 Justice Adkins, in dissent, would
have held the special act unconstitutional because it delegated a
policy decision to an individual's discretion." The policy decision
of whether the public had a "right to know" about teacher discipli-
nary proceedings was too important, in light of the Sunshine Law,
to so delegate. Further, under the delegation of powers doctrine,
the legislature can only delegate authority to certain officials and
administrative boards, not to individuals.47
In Bassett, the court construed the constitution to create an ex-
emption in the absence of legislative action; in Tribune Co., the
court inferred an exemption from two incongruous legislative en-
actments. Notwithstanding the legislature's subsequent elimina-
tion of one of the exemptions created in Bassett, in both cases the
court was acting well within its powers.
In Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co.,4 8 the problem of
conflicting statutes rose again; this time, however, in reference to
student disciplinary proceedings. As in Tribune Co., the case re-
quired consideration of the issue of delegation of authority. The
question in Marston was whether the honor court of a state univer-
sity could hold closed student disciplinary hearings in order to rec-
ommend a disposition to the Board of Regents.4' The trial court
found that student discipline was a Board of Regents matter that
had been delegated to the university president and further dele-
gated to the student honor court. Since the Board of Regents
would itself be required to meet "in the sunshine" to conduct dis-
ciplinary proceedings, the court held that the delegation of the
proceedings to the honor court subjected it to the Sunshine Law as
well. 50 The fact that the president of the university was not a
proper delegate for the Board of Regents' authority was considered
immaterial.51
44. Id. at 628.
45. Id. at 629.
46. Id. at 630.
47. Id. at 629-30. See Note, Florida's Adherence to the Doctrine of Nondelegation of
Legislative Power, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 541 (1979).
48. 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
49. Id. at 784.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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The First District Court of Appeal reversed, but did not address
the delegation of authority issue.52 Rather, the court based its re-
versal on the statutory exemption of certain university student
records from the Public Records Law.53 As in Tribune Co., the
Marston court held that a later specific law was more expressive of
legislative intent than an earlier general law." The legislature had
limited the public's access to university student records. The
Board of Regents had promulgated the complementary rule that
student consent was required prior to release of student discipli-
nary records. Therefore, opening the disciplinary proceedings in
which the exempted records would be created would subvert the
"beneficial policy" of limiting access to university student
records.55 The court stated, "[T]here is little purpose in preserving
from public view a [record] of a witness' testimony . . . if the pub-
lic is there to hear the spoken word. '56
Unlike Bassett, Tribune Co., and Marston, where the courts
merely used construction powers to recognize exemptions to the
Sunshine Law, in the following cases the courts actually created
exemptions to the Sunshine Law.
The quasi-judicial exemption has the most interesting history.
Created in Canney v. Board of Public Instruction," by the First
District Court of Appeal, it was rejected by the Florida Supreme
Court, only to be resurrected in a later First District Court of Ap-
peal case.58 In Canney, a county school board recessed a student
disciplinary proceeding in order to privately deliberate on its deci-
sion. The recess was challenged as violative of the Sunshine Law."
The first district, characterizing the school board's actions as
quasi-judicial, held that the private deliberation was privileged and
thus exempt from the Sunshine Law's operation." The Florida Su-
preme Court reversed. 61 The supreme court acknowledged that the
school board's private deliberation was correctly categorized as a
quasi-judicial function, but held that, nevertheless, the Sunshine
52. Id. at 786.
53. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(b) (1979).
54. 341 So. 2d at 786.
55. Id. at 785.
56. Id.
57. 231 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
58. State Dep't of Pollution Control v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
59. 278 So. 2d at 262.
60. 231 So. 2d at 39.
61. 278 So. 2d at 264.
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Law applied.2 The court based its decision on the separation of
powers doctrine.63 The Federal Constitution requires notice and a
hearing to protect a student's due process rights." The legislature
has the power to delegate authority to an administrative agency to
provide notice and conduct a hearing. Such a delegation, however,
does not transform the administrative agency into a part of the
judicial branch of the government. Notwithstanding the perform-
ance of a quasi-judicial function, the administrative agency re-
mains a part of the legislative branch of government." The legisla-
ture further has the power to mandate that all meetings conducted
by the legislative branch of the government should be conducted in
the sunshine. Since the legislature did not create an exemption for
quasi-judicial functions, the school board's deliberations must be
held in the sunshine.6 Therefore, the court stated, "The judiciary
should not encroach upon the Legislature's right to require that
the activities of the School Board be conducted in the
'sunshine.' "67
The dissent in Canney argued that it was no more necessary for
the legislature to expressly exempt quasi-judicial functions from
the Sunshine Law than it was to expressly exempt a jury's or
judge's deliberations. 8 The dissent likened the public deliberation
ordered by the majority to a "return to the Roman Arena for a
'thumbs up or thumbs down' result by public clamor."6 ' Such a
procedure violated the independence of any proceeding of a judi-
cial character and was "a denial of due process. ' '17
The Canney dissent was echoed, although not cited, in State De-
partment of Pollution Control v. State Career Service Commis-
sion.71 At issue was the Career Service Commission's reinstatement
of an employee who had been terminated by the Department of
Pollution Control. The employee appealed to the Commission after
his dismissal, there was a hearing "in the sunshine," and the Com-
mission reinstated the employee." The State Department of Pollu-
62. Id. at 262-63.
63. Id. at 262.
64. Id. at 263.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 264.
68. Id. at 264-65.
69. Id. at 264.
70. Id. at 265.
71. 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
72. Id. at 847.
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tion Control appealed.73 Although the First District Court of Ap-
peal vacated the Commission's order of reinstatement, it went on,
at the behest of the parties, to determine "'once and for all'
whether the deliberations of the ... Commission following hear-
ings ... are subject to ... the Government in the Sunshine
Law. 117 The court likened the Commission's deliberations to that
of a petit jury and an appellate court, and held they were a quasi-
judicial exemption from the Sunshine Law.7
The decision was in direct conflict with Canney which held that
the judiciary could not create a quasi-judicial exemption to the
Sunshine Law.76 The only difference between the Commission's au-
thority to review employee discipline and the school board's au-
thority to consider student discipline, is that the legislature pro-
vided that the Commission should have thirty days in which to
deliberate7 7 but placed no such definite time limitation on the
school board. 8 Implied in Pollution Control is that the legislative
intent in creating a thirty-day deliberation period was to allow the
Commission's deliberations to be conducted privately.7 9 That im-
plied intent is logical. However, as the Florida Supreme Court
pointed out in Canney, the legislature had rejected an amendment
to the Sunshine Law which would have exempted employee disci-
plinary hearings. 80 Therefore, although the district court's infer-
ence in Pollution Control was logical, it was not necessarily valid.
On the other hand, the supreme court's decision in Canney, re-
lating to school board deliberations, is also open to question.. As
the First District Court of Appeal pointed out in Marston, the leg-
islature has recognized a privacy right for student records. 81 Argu-
ably, in Canney, as in Marston, the entire student disciplinary
proceeding could have been held privately. What the First District
Court of Appeal in Marston did not mention, however, was that
the legislature exempted student disciplinary records from the stu-
dent's right of privacy for use as evidence in student expulsion
73. Id.
74. Id. at 848.
75. Id. at 849.
76. 278 So. 2d at 262.
77. 320 So. 2d at 848-49 (citing ch. 67-437, § 6, 1967 Fla. Laws 1382 (repealed 1979)).
78. FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(c)(4) (1979) provides for a "reasonable" time. Id.
79. 320 So. 2d at 849.
80. 278 So. 2d at 263.
81. 341 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(d)
(1979).
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hearings conducted by district school boards.82 Whether university
honor courts are sufficiently like district school boards to render
Marston incorrect, or whether "hearings" includes the deliberation
process are, thus, left uncertain. What is certain is that the first
district is more willing to find an exemption to the Sunshine Law
than is the supreme court, and that the district court's willingness
extends to directly contradicting the supreme court's ruling about
quasi-judicial actions.
In Bennett v. Warden,85 the Second District Court of Appeal
created the "remoteness" exemption from the Sunshine Law. In
Bennett, the president of St. Petersburg Junior College appointed
several employees to a Career Employees Council. Thereafter, the
president and the Council met periodically, in private, to discuss
working conditions, including wages and hours." A labor organizer,
seeking to unionize employees of the college, challenged the pri-
vately held meetings as violative of the Sunshine Law and the Em-
ployees Relations Act.88 The labor organizer argued that since the'
Junior College Board of Trustees must meet in the sunshine, so
also must the president and Council, as designees of the Board.
The court rejected that argument.8 6 The president was an execu-
tive officer, not a "board" or "commission," and thus, by defini-
tion, was not subject to the Sunshine Law.87 Although the Council
was a group to which the Sunshine Law restrictions could apply,
the court declined to impose them in view of the facts of the case.88
The court reasoned that the Council was not a policy-making body,
but a fact-revealing body; that the Board of Trustees did not con-
trol it; and that the president reported the results of the meetings
with the Council to an intermediary Administrative Council which,
in turn, reported to the Board of Trustees.8 9 Therefore, the court
concluded, the Career Employees Council was "too remote in the
82. FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(d) 7 (1979).
83. 333 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
84. Id. at 98.
85. Id. at 98, 100. The court found the Employees Relations Act to be inapplicable to the
facts of the case. Id. at 100.
86. Id. at 98.
87. Id. at 99.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 100. But cf. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974)
(citizen planning committee appointed to consult with planning firm to revise town's zoning
ordinances is alter-ego of town council and thus subject to Sunshine Law). In Bennett, the
court distinguished the facts of Town of Palm Beach on the grounds that the committee
had been directly appointed by the town council and that the committee was directly in-
volved in policy making. 333 So. 2d at 99.
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decision-making process" to be a designee of the Board of Trustees
subject to the Sunshine Law."' Certainly, the court's decision was
influenced by its own opinion that requiring administrators to con-
duct all business meetings in the sunshine would "unduly hamper
the efficient operation of modern government."'91 However, as the
Florida Supreme Court pointed out in Canney, the remedy for ad-
ministrative inconvenience lies with the legislature, not the
judiciary.2
The "remoteness" exemption was later presented to the Third
District Court of Appeal in Krause v. Reno." Although the re-
moteness exemption was held inapplicable in Krause, it was not
discredited. On the contrary, the court accepted the validity of the
exemption but merely held that the facts of the case did not fit
within the definition of "remote.".' Therefore, it is possible that
other courts, on similar facts, will also use the remoteness exemp-
tion to circumvent the Sunshine Law.
In Krause, the city manager of Miami appointed a citizen's advi-
sory group to screen applicants for the position of Miami Chief of
Police." The group had a "direct influence" on the final selec-
tion.' 6 The court held the advisory group was thus a "board"
within the definition of the Sunshine Law.' 7 Further, through the
act of appointment, the city manager became an "agency."' As to
the latter classification, the court relied on the analogous Public
Records Law, which refers to "agency," 9 to conclude that the city
manager came within the purview of the Sunshine Law. 00 By that
same reasoning, the second district's conclusion in Bennett that
the president was not included in the Sunshine Law can be ques-
tioned. The president in Bennett, like the city manager in Krause,
appointed a group. Both the president and the city manager ap-
pointed the group to aid them in making recommendations to leg-
islative boards subject to the Sunshine Law. Therefore, both the
90. 333 So. 2d at 100.
91. Id.
92. 278 So. 2d at 264.
93. 366 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
.94. Id. at 1247. The court held that neither Bennett nor Town of Palm Beach v.
Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974), was directly on point and that the facts in Krause fell
"somewhere between" the two. 366 So. 2d at 1247-48.
95. 366 So. 2d 1246.
96. Id. at 1247.
97. Id. at 1252.
98. Id.
99. See FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1979), quoted at note 146 infra.
100. 366 So. 2d at 1252.
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president and the city manager should have been classified as
"agencies" within the purview of the Sunshine Law.
The third judicially created exemption to the Sunshine Law is
an express approval of the Bennett conclusion that the president,
as an executive officer, is not subject to the Sunshine Law. In Occi-
dental Chemical Co. v. Mayo,1'0 the Florida Supreme Court cited
Bennett as support for the proposition that "staff is not subject to
the [Sunshine] law." In Occidental, the petitioner, challenging a
Public Service Commission decision, contended that the decision
was made in violation of the Sunshine Law. Since the Commission
considered a complex twenty-seven and one-half page document
for only ninety minutes, the petitioner concluded that the Com-
mission met secretly or delegated decisionmaking authority to its
staff.'02 In either case, a violation of the Sunshine Law had to oc-
cur. Secret meetings, of course, are impermissible under the law.103
And if the staff had the authority of the Commission to make deci-
sions, its elevated rank would then subject it to the law.'0 4
In rejecting the argument that all meetings between the commis-
sioners and their staff must be open to the public, the supreme
court simply stated that "[t]he Commission's staff is not subject to
the [Sunshine] law.' 0 5 Since no evidence of secret meetings ex-
isted, the court refused to speculate as to what occurred regarding
the preparation of the document, although it conceded that the
adoption of such a long, complex document with little discussion
created "an appearance of pre-judgment."' 0 6 The lack of evidence,
however, is easily attributed to the fact that those involved want to
keep the secret meeting secret. A good "secret meeting" should
leave no evidence. The court minimized this appearance of impro-
priety by stating that "[t]he [Sunshine] law is satisfied if the com-
missioners reached a mutual decision . . . when they met together
in public for their 'formal action.' "107 The court also noted that if
members of a collegial administrative body were obliged to avoid
their staff during their deliberations, "the value of staff expertise
would be lost and the intelligent use of employees would be crip-
101. 351 So. 2d 336, 341 (Fla. 1977). See also 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 199 (1978) for discus-
sion of the Occidental decision.
102. 351 So. 2d at 341.
103. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1979).
104. Town of Palm Beach V. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
105. 351 So. 2d at 341.
106. Id. at 341-42.
107. Id. at 342.
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pled."'10 8 Petitioner's argument, however, was not directed toward
whether the staff was present or absent during the deliberations.
Instead, the assertion was that, regardless of the staff's presence,
there was a private meeting among the commissioners or that an
improper delegation of authority to the staff had occurred.'0 "
The precise point at which discussions between the Commission
and its staff would become subject to the Sunshine Law was not
determined by the court. As long as "formal actions" occur in pub-
lic and there is no evidence of secret meetings at which "final deci-
sions" are reached, advisory bodies may meet privately, even
though "the robust and open public debate which advocates of
open government would like" is not produced." 0
Less than one year later, in Florida Parole and Probation Com-
mission v. Thomas,"' the First District Court of Appeal stated
that "[ilt is well settled that frequent unpublicized meetings be-
tween an agency member and advisors, consultants or staff. . . are
not meetings within the contemplation of the Sunshine Law." As
support, the court cited Occidental and Bennett. When the Florida
Parole and Probation Commission appealed a Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings order, appellee Thomas alleged that the decision
to take the appeal was "formal action" that should have been
reached in a public meeting pursuant to the Sunshine Law." 2 The
Parole and Probation Commission never met to decide whether to
take the appeal, but in its own words filed the appeal "'following
individual discussions between legal staff and each commissioner
concerning the final order rendered.' """ The Thomas court held
that the decision to take the appeal did not trigger the operation of
the Sunshine Law, stating that "[iln the absence of a meeting" the
law did not apply." 4
Although recognizing that the spirit of the law requires a con-
struction in favor of public access and against evasive devices, the
court stated that requiring a public meeting to ratify a legal deci-
sion would "unduly hamper" the Commission and make "effective
legal representation virtually impossible."' 1 5 The court found noth-
108. Id. at 342 n.10.
109. Id. at 338, 341.
110. Id. at 342.
111. 364 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 481.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 481-82.
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ing improper about private discussions between the Commission
and its staff. 1 These discussions, however, help to shape the is-
sues. Public access is important because without "robust and open
debate" the issues may be ignored or subsumed by private inter-
ests. The reasons for the choice of a particular solution may reflect
the requirements of influential groups. Such reasoning, of course,
may not be able to withstand the scrutiny that accompanies full
public access. To assure more responsible decisionmaking, these
types of private discussions should be "in the sunshine."
It appears that although the judiciary is wary about creating any
exemptions to the Sunshine Law, those judicial exemptions already
in existence are not sufficiently limited. Some exemptions, such as
the ones in Bassett and Tribune Co., were fairly exempted from
the Sunshine Law because of specific constitutional or legislative
expressions. Other exemptions, such as those created in Occidental
and Thomas, seem to put a premium on sophisticated evasive tac-
tics to avoid the operation of the law. If a secret meeting can be
arranged, or even better, no meeting at all, it is possible to avoid
triggering the Sunshine Law.
In sum, under today's Sunshine Law, school boards may consult
with their own labor negotiators privately, but must consult pub-
licly with the teachers' bargaining agents. Junior college presi-
dents, however, may privately discuss working conditions, hours,
and wages with an appointed employee advisory group. City man-
agers, on the other hand, must meet publicly with citizen advisory
groups appointed to screen applicants for a civil post. As for disci-
plinary proceedings, school boards must deliberate on a student's
discipline in public, but the Career Service Commission may, at
least within the jurisdiction of the First District Court of Appeal,
deliberate over an employee's discipline in private. University
honor courts may privately discipline university students; so also
may teachers be privately disciplined by a school board. In other
circumstances, both teachers and students must be disciplined in
public. The members of the Public Service Commission and the
Parole and Probation Commission may privately consult with their
staff on an individual basis. The Public Service Commission mem-
bers can then meet publicly to announce the rate structures deci-
sions that were a result of the individual consultations. The Parole
and Probation Commission, however, does not have to go through
the formality of a public meeting before authorizing its staff to
116. Id. at 482.
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proceed with implementing the decision that resulted from the in-
dividual consultations.
The above exemptions from the Sunshine Law are not so numer-
ous as to overwhelm the legislative intent. The exemptions, how-
ever, are contradictory enough to raise the spectre of a foggy
future. The courts have obviously been attempting to clarify an
extremely broad statute by balancing the intent of the legislature
with the need for practical application of the Sunshine Law. Per-
haps the emphasis on the facts of each case reflects the courts' de-
sire to limit the scope of the exemptions to the particular case at
hand. If this is so, the judiciary should be reluctant to create ex-
emptions and should construe both the statutory and constitu-
tional exemptions narrowly. Such a course of conduct will continue
to protect the public's broad right to know under the Sunshine
Law, while permitting sensible resolutions of those cases where ap-
plication of the law would interfere with other important interests.
THE PUBLIC RECORDS LAW
The Public Records Law was enacted in 1909.117 It was substan-
tively amended in 1967.118 Perhaps because the public records con-
cept was not brand new; perhaps because the 1967 amendments
did not have an immediate impact on day-to-day political
processes, passage of the Public Records law did not raise the kind
of stormy controversy which clouded the Sunshine Law's history.
Whether there were squalls or ill winds attending the drafting of
the amendments, however, is a question that cannot be answered.
As is the case with the Sunshine Law, committee files and debates
are unavailable. 19
Like the Sunshine Law, the Public Records Law is facially all-
inclusive: "[A]U state, county, and municipal records shall at all
times be open for a personal inspection by any person. 1 2 0 Unlike
the Sunshine Law, the Public Records Law provides for the spe-
cific exemption of certain public records.1 21 This difference has re-
117. Ch. 5942, 1909 Fla. Laws 132 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (1979)).
118. Ch. 67-125, 1967 Fla. Laws 254 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (1979)).
119. Interview with B. Gene Baker, Director of Florida Division of Legislative Library
Services, in Tallahassee, Fla. (May 23, 1980). Mr. Baker did not wish to rule out the possi-
bility that these records might someday be found.
120. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1979).
121. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a)-(k) (1979) lists the exemptions:
(3)(a) All public records which are presently provided by law to be confidential
or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether by general or
special law, shall be exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
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sulted in a different judicial attitude."' 2 Under the rules of statu-
tory interpretation, enumerated exemptions are indicative of the
legislative intent to leave all unmentioned items subject to the
law.12 3 Courts have less justification for creating judicial exemp-
tions to the Public Records Law than they have for creating ex-
emptions to the Sunshine Law. One consequence of enumerated
exemptions is that the legislature can, and has, added to their
number."1'
The statutory exemptions to the Public Records Law are varied
and create the impression of careful execution. For example, the
value of an estate that is disclosed in estate tax returns or any
(b) All public records referred to in ss. 198.09, 199.222, 228.093, 257.261,
288.075, 624.311(2), 624.319(3) and (4), 657.061(3), 658.10(3), and 794.03 are ex-
empt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(c) Examination questions and answer sheets of examinations administered by
a governmental agency for the purpose of licensure, certification, or employment
shall be exempt from the provisions of subsection (1). However, an examinee shall
have the right to review his own completed examination.
(d) Active criminal intelligence information and active criminal investigative
information are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(e) Any information revealing the identity of confidential informants or
sources is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(f) Any information revealing surveillance techniques or procedures or person-
nel is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(g) Any information revealing undercover personnel of any criminal justice
agency is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(h) Any criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information
including the photograph, name, address, or other fact or information which
reveals the identity of the victim of any sexual battery as defined by chapter 794
or child abuse as defined by chapter 827 is exempt from the provisions of subsec-
tion (1).
(i) Any criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information
which reveals the personal assets of the victim of a crime, other than property
stolen or destroyed during the commission of the crime, is exempt from the provi-
sions of subsection (1).
(j) All criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information received by
a criminal justice agency prior to January 25, 1979, is exempt from the provisions
of subsection (1).
(k) The home addresses, telephone numbers, and photographs of law enforce-
ment personnel; the home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, and places
of employment of the spouses and children of law enforcement personnel; and the
names and locations of schools attended by the children of law enforcement per-
sonnel are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
122. See, e.g., Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1980); Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
123. State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
124. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1979).
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values set forth in intangible tax returns are confidential."2 5 Stu-
dent educational records are confidential, unless the student or a
parent or guardian consents in writing to the release of the
records.' Upon request, documents of the Division of Economic
Development concerning a business' plans to expand or relocate in
Florida are confidential for twenty-four months."'
The Department of Insurance may withhold examination or in-
vestigation reports from public inspection "for so long as it deems
reasonably necessary to protect the person examined" or if it
would be in the public interest. 2 ' Most other insurance depart-
ment records are open to public inspection.129 While some credit
union records are confidential, most are subject to various disclo-
sure rules.8 0 Banking records are similarly treated. "' Finally, any
information that identifies a sexual offense victim is not permitted
to be printed, published or broadcast.8 2
There is also a general exemption in the law that provides, "All
public records which presently are provided by law to be confiden-
tial or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public,
whether by general or special law, shall be exempt . . . ."18 One
judicially created exemption, that for consultant's records, was
eliminated by a legislative amendment to the Public Records
Law.8 4 Two other judicially created exemptions were validated by
legislative amendments, thereby creating statutory exemptions for
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege and for
certain police records.8 5 The Florida Supreme Court has imposed
125. FLA. STAT. §§ 198.09, 199.222 (1979). Inspection of the returns is permitted in three
instances. The Florida Department of Revenue "may permit the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, any collector of Internal Revenue, or Internal Revenue agent of the United States,
or the proper officer of any state imposing an estate tax or inheritance tax . . . to inspect
the estate tax returns of any individual." FLA. STAT. § 198.09(1).
126. FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(d) (1979). Certain educational organizations are exempted
from the consent requirement as well. See id. at § 228.093(3)(d)(1)-(8).
127. FLA. STAT. § 228.075 (1979).
128. FLA. STAT. § 624.319(3) (1979).
129. FLA. STAT. § 624.311(3) (1979).
130. FLA. STAT. § 657.061(1)-(5) (1979).
131. FLA. STAT. § 658.10(1)-(5) (1979).
132. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1979).
133. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a) (1979). The Office of the Attorney General has written a
manual that lists privileged, confidential, and limited access public documents. FLORIDA
OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS MANuAL 49 (1978).
134. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1979). This amendment effectively overruled the consult-
ant records exemption created in State ex rel. Tindel v. Sharp, 300 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1975).
135. Florida Evidence Code, FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1) (1979) (creating attorney-client privi-
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a moratorium on all other judicially created and public policy ex-
emptions.' The court has also rejected an exemption based upon
an asserted right of disclosural privacy. 3 7 The development of the
current judicial posture toward the creation of exemptions is
traced through a discussion of the decisions construing the Public
Records Law or establishing exemptions to its operation.
In State ex rel. Tindel v. Sharp,' the Duval County School
Board hired Dr. Bert L. Sharp, Dean of the College of Education
of the University of Florida, to recommend a new school superin-
tendent. Dr. Sharp had performed similar consultant services for
other school boards. He had over the years collected extensive per-
sonnel files on potential candidates. A news media representative,
Cecil M. Tindel, was denied access to these files.3 9 Tindel then
petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandamus which the trial
court denied. 40 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed.
141
The district court held that while the recommendations and pa-
pers which Dr. Sharp actually delivered to the school board were
public records, the personnel files upon which he based his recom-
mendations were private property and thus not subject to the Pub-
lic Records Law."42 The court characterized the personnel files as
work product."4 The court did not base its decision on a work
product privilege however, but rather on Dr. Sharp's status as a
consultant.' 4' The Public Records Law defines public records as
those materials "made or received . . . in connection with the
transaction of official business by any agency.""" The court held
lege exemption). FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(d)-(k) (1979) (creating police records exemption).
See Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979) (common law privileges
must be exempted by the legislature and not by the courts). See, e.g., Rose v. D'Alessandro,
364 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Glow v. State, 319 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (police records exemption).
136. See, e.g., Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1980); Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
137. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
138. 300 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 745 (Fla.
1975).
139. 300 So. 2d at 751.
140. Id. at 750.
141. Id. at 752.
142. Id. at 751-52.
143. Id. at 751.
144. Id.
145. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1979). The complete definition of public records provides:
(1) "Public records" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes,
photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regardless of physical form
or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection
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that the status of consultant was not included within the definition
of "agency." 146 Since Dr. Sharp was not an agency, his files were
not public records. 147 One year after Tindel, in 1975, the legislature
amended the definition of agency to include persons "acting on be-
half of any public agency. 1 48 As a result, consultants are now in-
cluded in the definition, and the need for the Tindel exemption
has been eliminated. This expansion of the Public Records Law's
application is analogous to the extension of the Sunshine Law's ap-
plication to citizen advisory groups."94 The public's right to know
cannot be circumvented by mere delegation of an agency function
to a private party.
In addition to the issue of whether consultants were subject to
the Public Records Law, Tindel also introduced two issues which
were to become crucial in subsequent cases. The first issue was
whether common law privileges, such as work product, were ex-
empted from the Public Records Law. This issue is still open to
debate. 10 The second issue was whether courts, as a matter of
public policy, could judicially create an exemption to protect the
confidentiality of sensitive records such as personnel files and in-
vestigative reports. This issue has been resolved in the negative. 15
Underlying both of these issues, indeed permeating the whole sub-
ject of the public's right to know, is the competing interest of the
individual's right to privacy. Ultimately, the Florida Supreme
Court was faced with the necessity of reconciling these two impor-
tant interests."5 " In order to better understand the reconciliation,
however, the pertinent judicial and legislative history should be
with the transaction of official business by any agency.
Id.
146. 300 So. 2d at 751. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1979) provides:
(2) "Agency" means any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer,
department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of govern-
ment created or established by law and any other public or private agency, person,
partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency.
147. 300 So. 2d at 751-52.
148. Ch. 75-225, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 637 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1979)).
149. See, e.g., Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974); Krause v.
Reno, 366 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
150. Compare Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979) (no work
product exemption) with Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633
(Fla. 1980) (rough drafts, preparatory notes are not public records). See also FLA. STAT. §
119.07(5) (1979) (exemptions not intended to expand or limit discovery in a criminal pro-
ceeding); FLA. STAT. § 447.605(3) (1979) (work product developed by public employer in
preparation for and during labor negotiations is exempt).
151. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979).
152. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
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traced.
In Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co.,"$3 the Lee County
Board of County Commissioners voted to place a warning in an
employee's personnel file. The employee was not named, but was
identified as a department head. The warning's contents were not
disclosed, but the Board's vote followed a failed motion to termi-
nate the employee for cause. When the local newspaper, Fort My-
ers News-Press, demanded to examine the personnel files of all
Lee County department heads, its request was refused.'" Subse-
quently, the newspaper obtained a writ of mandamus ordering the
county administrator to make the records public. 55 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed.15 6
The district court acknowledged that public employee's person-
nel files are public records within the definition of the Public
Records Law. 5" Further, the court recognized that there was no
specific statute exempting personnel files from the law's opera-
tion.15 8 The court construed the general exemption to the law,
however, as allowing courts to create exemptions as a matter of
public policy. "
The general exemption to the Public Records Law stated that
"[a]ll public records which presently are deemed by law to be con-
fidential .. . shall be exempt from the provisions of this sec-
tion."'6 o The court construed the phrase "deemed by law" to mean
judicial decisions as well as statutes.' 6' The court noted that gov-
ernment agencies relied on recommendations of past employers in
hiring civil servants. Unless these recommendations were held in
confidence, they would be difficult to obtain.' 6 Since private em-
ployers routinely guard the confidentiality of personnel files, gov-
ernment's failure to do so would diminish its ability to compete
with the private sector for qualified job applicants. Therefore it
was in the public interest to deem personnel files confidential. 68
153. 310 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), quashed and remanded, 345 So.
2d 646 (Fla. 1977).
154. 310 So. 2d at 346.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 349.
157. Id. at 347.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 349.
160. Ch. 67-125, § 7, 1967 Fla. Laws 254 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a)
(1979)).
161. 310 So. 2d at 347.
162. Id. at 348.
163. Id.
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Further, personnel files contained intimate, sometimes privileged,
sometimes damaging, information. 16' To allow anyone "to rum-
mage through the personnel files of any [public] employee ...
would be to make a mockery of" the right to privacy.16 Therefore,
"public policy clearly dictates that [personnel files] be deemed
confidential. '"1 61
In 1975, just months after the Wisher decision, the legislature
amended the general exemption to the Public Records Law by
changing the phrase "deemed by law" to read "provided by
law. 1 67 It was three years, however, before the significance of that
amendment was recognized by the courts."" Not even in 1977,
when the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Wisher decision, was
attention paid to the legislative amendment. 69
In Wisher, the supreme court found it inappropriate to consider
the broad issue of general access to personnel files.170 The docu-
ment which sparked the controversy "was authored by a public
body in an open public meeting.' ' 7 1 The document, that is, the
warning, was thus a public record. s7 Further, the Public Records
Law and the Sunshine Law together precluded the county commis-
sion from conducting "personnel business" by "ruses" such as
"pseudonyms or cloaked references.' 173 The identity of the depart-
ment head and the warning which had been placed in his person-
nel file were ordered to be disclosed to the Fort Myers News-
Press. 174
By disposing of the case on such narrow grounds, the supreme
court avoided both the broad issue of general access to personnel
files and the issue of a constitutional right to privacy. Further, the
supreme court found it unnecessary to construe the Public Records
Law to determine whether courts could create public policy ex-
emptions by "deeming" certain records "confidential.' ' 7 5
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 349.
167. Ch. 75-225, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 638 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(a)
(1979)).
168. See State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
169. News-Press Publishing Co. v. Wisher, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977).
170. Id. at 648.
171. Id. at 647.
172. Id. at 648.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Prior to the quashing of Wisher, or to the legislative amendment of the general
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In State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton,"6 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal relied on the 1975 amendment to the Public
Records Law's general exemption to conclude that courts could no
longer create judicial exemptions by "deeming" public records
"confidential." In Veale, the Boca Raton City Council directed its
attorney to prepare a report on irregularities in the building de-
partment, and the city attorney did so. The report recommending
that sanctions be taken against certain city employees was sent to
the State Attorney's Office. Despite the fact that some action was
taken by the City Council on the basis of the report, the City
Council refused to make the report public.1 77 The refusal was
based on the attorney's advice that both the Wisher decision and
the common law attorney-client privilege exempted the report
from public disclosure.17 8 Max Veale, the managing editor of the
local newspaper, the Boca Raton News, petitioned for a writ of
mandamus. "' The trial court dismissed the proceeding.180 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.181
The court noted that the phrase "deemed by law" connoted
exemption, the Second District Court of Appeal again used public policy as the reason for
"deeming" a public record "confidential." In Glow v. State, 319 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), a defendant in a criminal action demanded access to "all police reports made in
connection with the investigation of the charges" against him. Id. at 48. The court
"deemed" police reports "confidential," thus affirming the trial court's denial of the request.
Id. at 49. The court stated:
If police reports are held to be public records, there would be nothing to prevent
the local representatives of the Mafia from making weekly visits to the police sta-
tion in order to stay abreast of current efforts being made to investigate and
thwart crime. Due to the great public interest in protecting and safeguarding the
confidentiality of the police reports, the trial court [correctly held them] not open
to publc inspection.
Id. (emphasis added).
Apparently, the legislature agreed with this prediction. In order to ensure that other
courts would not require the disclosure of sensitive police records, the Public Records Law
was amended in 1979 to provide for the exemption of police investigatory records and other
information. Ch. 79-187, 1979 Fla. Laws 723 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(d)-(k)
(1979)). Thus, the public policy exemption for police records became a statutory as well as a
judicial exemption to the law. For a discussion of the countervailing policy considerations of
personal privacy, governmental secrecy, and the law enforcement exemption, see Comment,
Texas Open Records Act: Law Enforcement Agencies' Investigatory Records, 29 Sw. L.J.
431 (1975).
176. 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
177. Id. at 1195.
178. Id. The Florida Supreme Court had not quashed Wisher at the time the attorney
gave this advice.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1198.
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"opinions and decisions of courts and judges."1 2 But, continued
the court, "'the term "provided by law" means provided by statute
law.' "183 Therefore, the court concluded that the legislative pur-
pose "was specifically to overrule" Wisher."" Courts could not cre-
ate public policy exemptions to the Public Records Law. Future
policy decisions would have to be made by the legislature. 185
In Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 8 the Florida Supreme
Court adopted the fourth district's view in Veale. The Wait case
arose from litigation before the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Florida Power & Light Company, pursuant to the
Public Records Law, requested inspection of the City of New
Smyrna Beach's records concerning the planning, operation, and
maintenance of the city's electrical system. New Smyrna Beach de-
nied the request, claiming that its attorney would have to review
the records to remove privileged or confidential documents before
the records would be made public.18 7 Florida Power & Light Com-
pany petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The trial court granted
the writ. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. 88
The district court faced two issues in Wait. The first was
whether the taking of an appeal by a public agency automatically
stayed the trial court's order to disclose the disputed records. 189
The second issue was whether the common law privileges, such as
attorney-client and work product, were waived by the enactment of
the Public Records Law or were included in the general exemption
section.19 0
As to the first issue, the district court held the Public Records
Law, which provided that filing of an appeal shall not operate as
an automatic stay,19 1 had precedence over the Florida appellate
rule 1 92 which provided otherwise.193 The district court reasoned
that the appellate rule affected the substantive rights of the parties
182. Id. at 1196.
183. Id. (quoting Fountain v. State, 101 S.E. 294, 295-96 (Ga. 1919)).
184. 353 So. 2d at 1196.
185. Id. at 1197.
186. 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979), quashing in part and approving in part 353 So. 2d
1265 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
187. 353 So. 2d at 1266-67.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1266.
190. Id. at 1267.
191. FLA. STAT. § 119.11(2) (1979).
192. FLA. App. R. 5.12(1) (1979).
193. 353 So. 2d at 1267.
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because disclosure would be delayed.194 The Florida Supreme
Court reversed on this issue, holding that the appellate rule was
procedural, and thus had precedence over the Public Records
Law.195 Justice Sundberg dissented on this issue. He concluded
that since the Public Records Law provided for discretionary stays,
and only prohibited automatic stays, that it was not an intrusion
into the judicial power to establish procedural rules."" Justice
Sundberg would have held that the two rules were not in conflict 97
but since "this matter falls within the 'twilight zone'" between
substance and procedure, "the general policy considerations of the
[appellate rule] should give way to the special policy considera-
tions [of the Public Records Law]."'9 "
As to the second issue, the district court held that the general
exemption to the Public Records Law "clearly waives any common
law privilege of confidentiality which includes attorney-client com-
munications. '' a9 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on this is-
sue.2 0 0 The Public Records Law only allows statutory exemptions
"and not those documents which are confidential or privileged only
as a result of the judicially created privileges of attorney-client or
work product. 2 0 1 The court refused to "equate the acquisition of
public documents under [the Public Records Law] with the rights
of discovery afforded a litigant by judicially-created rules of
procedure." 20
Thus, in Wait, the Florida Supreme Court held that the judici-
ary could not create exemptions to the Public Records Law by
"deeming" records "confidential" in case decisions or in procedural
discovery rules.203 Only the legislature could exempt public records
from the law.2 04 The courts could, however, delay disclosure under
194. Id.
195. 372 So. 2d at 423.
196. Id. at 426.
197. Id. at 425.
198. Id. at 426.
199. 353 So. 2d at 1267.
200. 372 So. 2d at 424.
201. Id. Justice Overton dissented to the broad language used by the majority on this
issue because he feared that the opinion would be read to subject police reports to public
disclosure. Id. at 426. Since the legislature exempted police reports before the court ever
considered the issue directly, whether Justice Overton's fear would be realized is a moot
question. See FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(d)-(k) (1979).
202. 372 So. 2d at 425.
203. Id. a 424-25.
204. Id. at 425.
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the automatic stay rule.20 5
Subsequently, the Florida Evidence Code, which provides for an
attorney-client privilege, became effective.20 In a recent case af-
firmed by the First District Court of Appeal, the circuit court
quashed a writ of mandamus and found that the documents re-
quested under the writ were "privileged pursuant to Section 90.502
[establishing an attorney-client privilege] and are thus exempt
from the operation of [the Public Records Law]. '"207 This exemp-
tion is entirely supported by the legislative enactment of the Flor-
ida Evidence Code. The legislature's intent to create the privilege
is clear. Thus, the circuit court did not create this exemption, but
merely confirmed its existence by giving effect to a recent legisla-
tive expression. This type of inquiry is certainly within the domain
of the judiciary.
The Florida Supreme Court in Wait did not consider the
constitutionality of the Public Records Law as it related to the
individual's right to privacy. That issue arose in Shevin v. Byron,
Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc.2 0 8 The facts of Shevin were simi-
lar to the facts in Tindel. The records at issue were those compiled
by a consulting firm in a nation-wide search for a managing direc-
tor for a municipal electric utility. Some records were handwritten
notes made during interviews and others were resumes and letters
from prospective applicants. The consulting firm was advised by
the utility that only its written report would be a public record,
and the applicants were assured that the interviews were
confidential.'0 9
205. Id. at 423.
206. The code's effective date was July 1, 1979. Ch. 78-379, 1978 Fla. Laws 1052. The
Florida Evidence Code states in relevant part:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(b) A "client" is any person, public officer, corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer with the
purpose of obtaining legal services or who is rendered' legal services by a lawyer.
(c) A communication between lawyer and client is "confidential" if it is not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services
to the client.
2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
207. Aldredge v. Turlington, No. 79-1023 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County, Nov. 20, 1979),
aff'd, 378 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
208. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
209. Id. at 635.
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The First District Court of Appeal held that the consulting firm
was an "agency" to which the Public Records Law applied because
it was "acting on behalf of" the municipality.2" All the records
were public records since they were made "in connection with the
transaction of official business."21' Under these conditions, a writ
of mandamus would issue without question, since the law clearly
applies. The district court, however, found that the applicants had
a right of personhood, including the right of disclosural privacy, as
to the information acquired by the consulting firm. Therefore,
public disclosure of those records would work a deprivation of fun-
damental privacy rights secured by the federal and state constitu-
tions. Accordingly, the district court reversed the issuance of the
writ of mandamus 2
Whether a right of privacy exists under the state or federal con-
stitutions, rendering the Public Records Law unconstitutioiial, was
certified to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great pub-
lic interest.218 The court reviewed both the federal and state con-
stitutional questions as well as the district court's interpretation of
the definition of "public records."
Regarding the alleged federal disclosural privacy interest, the su-
preme court concluded that such an interest did not yet exist to
prevent public access to the consulting firm's papers.2  The gen-
eral right of privacy as construed by the United States Supreme
Court, stated the court, consists of three protected interests: secur-
ity from unwarranted governmental surveillance and intrusion, de-
cisional autonomy regarding personal intimate matters, and pro-
tection against the disclosure of personal matters.2 15 The
applicants argued that disclosure of the consulting firm's papers
was prevented by the privacy interest protecting against the disclo-
sure of personal matters.21 6 The supreme court relied primarily
upon Paul v. Davis,2 17 which also involved an allegedly damaging
release of information, to hold that the disclosural privacy interest
was insufficient to prevent public access to the papers.2 8 Charac-
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 636.
213. Id. at 634.
214. Id. at 638.
215. Id. at 636.
216. Id. at 637.
217. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
218. 379 So. 2d at 638. In Davis, petitioner contended that he was deprived of his consti-
tutional right of privacy when his name and photograph were placed on a flyer of "active
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terizing the interest as the newest and least defined, the Florida
Supreme Court concluded that until the United States Supreme
Court "breathe[s] life into the privacy interest asserted," no such
privacy interest existed.2 1 9
The supreme court also found no support for a state constitu-
tional right of disclosural privacy in the Florida Constitution or in
case law.220 Since the search and seizure provision of the constitu-
tion deals with the collection of information and not with the dis-
semination of information, the district court's reliance on that pro-
vision was misplaced s.22  The decisions cited by the district court to
support its holding that a right of disclosural privacy existed were
firmly distinguished by the supreme court because "none of these
cases provide the needed authority for such a holding. '222
Thus, a person who has contact with a state agency or an entity
acting for a state agency cannot have an expectation of privacy re-
garding those contacts. Admittedly, such a result will limit the
availability of certain information to state agencies, perhaps to an
agency's detriment. If a potential applicant for a state position re-
quires confidentiality, he or she cannot be accommodated. This re-
sult must be tempered with the knowledge that much information
has been made confidential for convenience only and not for more
compelling reasons. Should the public find that the operation of
the Public Records Law is too burdensome in a particular area,
then a legislative amendment should be sought.
The supreme court softened its holding to some extent by limit-
ing the district court's definition of public records.2 2 Instead of
applying the law to "almost everything generated or received by a
public agency," the supreme court held that a public record "is any
material prepared in connection with official agency business which
is intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of
shoplifters" and distributed to local merchants. Although Paul had been arrested for shop-
lifting, the charges had been dismissed. 424 U.S. at 695-96.
219. 379 So. 2d at 638.
220. Id. at 639. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 673, 713 (1978). A state right of privacy is discussed in the context of the
proposed constitutional revision. See also Comment, Informational Privacy and Public
Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977).
221. 379 So. 2d at 639.
222. Id. Two of the cases, Hagaman v. Andrews, 232 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970) and Cason v.
Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944), were distinguished on the basis that they involved com-
mon law or associational rights of privacy; one other case, In re Grand Jury Investigation,
287 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1973), concerned the suppression of intercepted communications, thus
involving the privacy interest of freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion.
223. 379 So. 2d at 640.
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some type. 22 4 The court distinguished rough drafts, preparatory
notes and dictation tapes as nonpublic materials while stating that
inter-office and intra-office memorandums constitute public
records. Classification of records not clearly in one group or the
other, said the court, will have to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.225
Thus, the supreme court established a selective definition of
public records. Once a document is formalized, it is a public re-
cord. Perhaps the only evasive device is to keep everything tenta-
tive, and to formalize nothing. Most bureaucracies do not operate
in this manner, so such behavior would be conspicuous. Therefore,
sensitive information will be subject to public disclosure unless the
legislature creates an appropriate exemption.
The invalidation of judicially created exemptions to the Public
Records Law should prevent further erosion of its scope. The en-
actment of the Florida Evidence Code's attorney-client privilege
will serve as protection against forced disclosure of confidential
communications or documents. All other public records, except
those specifically exempted by the legislature, are accessible to the
public at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions.2' One
troublesome area is the work product privilege which has not been
codified by the legislature. 227 Although in Wait the court specifi-
cally held that judicial rules of discovery could not exempt a confi-
dential work product from the Public Records Law, the definition
of public records given in Shevin clearly seems to exclude work
product. If one is careful not to characterize documents as "work
product," but rather asserts that the documents are exempt under
the Shevin public records definition, then the public disclosure of
those documents might still be avoided.
CONCLUSION
Both the Sunshine Law and the Public Records Law have been
narrowed by various exemptions. The extent to which they have
been narrowed, however, is small compared to their initial breadth.
The laws continue to guarantee public access without limitation in
many areas of governmental decisionmaking. Fortunately, the su-
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1979).
227. But see FLA. STAT. § 447.605(3) (1979) (work product developed by public employer
in preparation for and during labor negotiations is exempt).
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preme court has recognized, in the case of the Public Records Law,
that it is the legislature that should create exemptions. And the
legislature has responded to other interests in conflict with com-
plete public access by amending this law. Although the legislature
has not run rampant with such amendments, there is a danger of
nullifying the effect of the law through unrestrained tinkering.
Amendments to the law should be comprehensive and carefully ex-
ecuted, so that the Public Records Law will operate in an equita-
ble, sensible manner.
This philosophy should also be applied to the Sunshine Law.
The supreme court has not yet articulated a ban on further judicial
exemptions to that law, as it has done for exemptions to the Public
Records Law. The Sunshine Law should also be limited only by
the legislature so that courts will be construing exemptions rather
than creating them in response to a particular factual situation. In
this way, open government in Florida will continue to benefit the
public. Without thoughtful action by both the judiciary and the
legislature, the proliferation of exemptions will surely cloud Flor-
ida's government "in the sunshine."
